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1. Introduction 
 Corporate governance is typically defined as the set of mechanisms designed to mitigate 
agency problems that arise between shareholders and managers because of the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2003; 
Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010). Information asymmetry between these parties has been 
identified as the main source of agency problems, which implies that a firm’s information 
environment is a crucial input that affects the design of its corporate governance mechanisms 
that are implemented to monitor managers. 1
Although corporate governance and various attributes of firms’ information environments 
are invariably linked, the precise nature of the relation between these two constructs is not 
entirely understood (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010). Further exacerbating the 
difficulty in establishing the link between firms’ corporate governance structures and their 
information environment is the endogenous relation between these two constructs (Armstrong et 
al., 2010).
 Not surprisingly, the relation between firms’ 
corporate governance structures and their information environments has been of interest to policy 
makers, regulators, and academics.  
2
                                                          
1  Throughout this paper we characterize and refer to the firm’s information environment as the variation in 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, information asymmetry among investors, informativeness 
of public financial statements, analyst following, and private information gathering (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010; Frankel 
and Li, 2004). 
  Not surprisingly, extant empirical studies provide conflicting evidence on the 
relation between firms’ corporate governance structures and their information environments 
2 In particular, Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss how a large body of literature argues that a firm’s governance 
structure is, to a large extent, a choice variable and is therefore endogenous with respect to its information 
environment. In addition, prior research (e.g., DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005) argues that a firm’s information 
environment in general, and its financial disclosure and reporting practices in particular, are also choice variables 
and are therefore endogenous with respect to the firm’s governance structure. This makes it difficult to distinguish 
between a causal effect (and the direction of causality) and an association between corporate governance and firms’ 
information environments. 
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(e.g., Bushman et al., 2004, Warfield et al., 1995, Ajinkya et al., 2005). Accordingly, the nature 
of this relation is still an open empirical question that warrants further examination.  
This study adds to our understanding of the relation between firms’ governance structures 
and their information environments by examining how changes in antitakeover protection, which 
is an important element of firms’ overall corporate governance structure, affects their 
information environments. The second-generation state antitakeover laws, which affected firms 
incorporated in the states passing these laws, were adopted in the United States starting in the 
mid-1980s. We use the passage of these laws as a source of exogenous variation in firms’ 
corporate governance structures with which we identify the causal effect of a change in corporate 
governance on firms’ information environments. 
 Changes in antitakeover provisions can affect a firm’s information environment and the 
level of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors in several ways. First, 
antitakeover provisions can have an effect on the level of private information gathering in the 
capital markets (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). For example, more or stronger antitakeover provisions 
imply a lower probability of a takeover (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992), which provides traders 
with fewer incentives to collect private information for speculative purposes. Consistent with this 
view, Larcker and Lys (1987) document that risk arbitragers, who speculate on the likelihood of 
takeover, earn substantial returns, which suggests that these traders have incentives to collect and 
trade on the basis of private information.  
In addition, changes in the degree of antitakeover protection can affect a firm’s 
information environment by influencing the level of corporate transparency and the quality of 
financial information generated and provided by the firm through several channels. An increase 
in antitakeover provisions reduces the threat of a hostile takeover, which insulates managers 
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from the disciplining effects of the market for corporate control. The increase in entrenchment 
might reduce managers’ incentives to provide transparent information to the capital markets and 
other external parties (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Fu and Liu, 
2008). Alternatively, once insulated from the threat of a takeover, managers may enjoy the so-
called “quiet life” and make fewer investments. The resulting reduction in future cash flow 
volatility might result in improved financial statement informativeness. Moreover, managers 
might feel more secure about their labor market prospects and therefore become less concerned 
about concealing poor performance through financial reports. Finally, managers might want to 
voluntarily improve their financial reporting quality following the passage of the antitakeover 
laws to allow for better monitoring, especially if the firm seeks to raise external equity capital. 
 Another channel through which changes in the degree of antitakeover protection can 
affect a firm’s information environment is their influence on the behavior of equity analysts. 
Analysts have incentives to gather private information, especially about important events such as 
mergers and acquisitions, and the passage of the antitakeover laws might reduce analysts’ 
incentives to gather private information, which, in turn, might affect the quality of information 
they provide. Alternatively, if analysts serve as monitors, then an increase in antitakeover 
provisions might cause them to expend greater effort to collect and disseminate information.  
Therefore, there are several competing predictions regarding how corporate governance 
mechanisms in general, and oversight from the market for corporate control in particular, may 
affect firms’ information environments. We examine the relation between these two constructs 
using variation in firms’ corporate governance structures that resulted from the passage of 
antitakeover laws by a number of U.S. states between 1985 and 1991 as a pseudo-natural 
experiment. An important advantage of this setting is that, unlike recent regulatory changes that 
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applied to all firms at the same time, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) or Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg. FD), the passage of antitakeover laws occurred at different times in different 
states. 3
 We first examine the effect of changes in state antitakeover laws on the level of 
information asymmetry. We find strong evidence that the level of information asymmetry 
significantly declined following the passage of these laws. We also find that the level of 
idiosyncratic volatility decreased following the passage of the laws, indicating that they led to a 
reduction in private information gathering. Further, we document an increase in the 
 This variation allows us to use a differences-in-differences research design, which 
enables a more precise identification of the causal effects of the antitakeover laws. A major 
limitation of studies that evaluate and analyze the economic consequences of a broad regulation 
such as SOX and Reg. FD is that the regulation generally applies to every firm at the same time, 
which makes it difficult to identify an appropriate control group that is not affected by the 
regulation. This makes it difficult to uniquely identify and distinguish the effect of the regulation 
from other contemporaneous changes that might have occurred and in turn limits researchers’ 
ability to draw casual inferences about the effects of the regulation of interest. Our use of a 
differences-in-differences research design addresses these concerns by using both the same firm 
over time (potentially before and after the passage of antitakeover laws) and similar firms in 
different states at the same time (which potentially had different antitakeover laws) as the control 
group. This approach allows us to draw causal inferences about the effect of corporate 
governance on firms’ information environments. 
                                                          
3 The state specific antitakeover laws did not apply to all firms at the same time but were instead passed and became 
effective at different times. Our empirical methodology exploits this fact and our control group is not restricted to 
firms in states that never pass an antitakeover law. In fact, the specific multivariate regression we discuss in Section 
3 can be estimated even if all states eventually pass antitakeover laws. We implicitly treat as our control group all 
firms incorporated in states not passing a law at a specific time, even if they have already done so in a previous year 
or will pass one in the future.  
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informativeness of financial statements. In addition, we also find a significant decline in analyst 
coverage following the passage of the laws, which is also consistent with the laws causing a 
reduction in private information gathering. Finally, we attempt to distinguish among the 
competing theories for why and how financial statement informativeness would change after the 
passage of the antitakeover laws and provide evidence suggesting that the increase in financial 
statement informativeness is attributable to firms that are most likely to access equity markets. In 
contrast, we find little support for the quiet life, career concern, and managerial entrenchment 
hypotheses. 
The contribution of our study is threefold. First, we add to the literature that examines the 
relation between firms’ corporate governance structures and their information environments by 
providing evidence on the causal relation between these two constructs.4 The extant empirical 
evidence is mixed and depends on the specific governance mechanism and the specific 
dimension of the information environment examined. One potential explanation for the 
conflicting evidence, and a more general concern with the existing literature, is the endogenous 
relation between a firm’s governance structure and its information environment, since these two 
constructs are expected to be jointly determined (Armstrong et al., 2010).5
                                                          
4 See Bushman and Smith (2001, 2003) and Armstrong et al. (2010) for detailed surveys of this literature.  
 By using the passage 
of the state antitakeover laws as an exogenous increase in firms’ protection from hostile 
takeovers, our results are less susceptible to endogeneity concerns that plague the existing 
literature.  
5 For example, one might predict a positive relation between the number of outside directors and a firm’s financial 
statement transparency because outside directors require timely and reliable information to fulfill their monitoring 
role. A positive relation between the proportion of outside directors and the level of financial statement transparency 
could occur either if firms commit to providing high-quality financial disclosures in anticipation of the informational 
needs of their outside directors or if firms’ outside directors elicit higher-quality financial information. Although 
both scenarios would produce a positive relation between the proportion of outside directors and financial statement 
transparency, only the latter scenario is one in which the firm’s governance structure causes changes in its 
information environment.  
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Second, in addition to examining changes in firms’ information environments in general, 
we also examine the channels through which these changes in the overall information 
environment occur. Specifically, we explore the impact of the antitakeover laws on information 
supplied by firms and private information gathering outside of firms. This analysis is important, 
since information asymmetry and private information flow could change for reasons other than 
changes in the information that firms supply. Moreover, prior research tends to focus on only a 
single aspect of a firm’s information environment such as voluntary disclosures (e.g., earnings 
forecasts), and therefore does not speak to the information environment as a whole. Therefore, 
the extant literature cannot speak to the net effect of corporate governance mechanisms on either 
the information asymmetry between managers and investors or the information asymmetry 
among investors. 
 Third, our study contributes to the literature that examines the economic consequences of 
the passage of state antitakeover laws. A number of studies in the law, economics, and finance 
literatures find that these laws have had significant economic effects. For example, prior research 
has documented that the antitakeover laws led to a reduction in the equity ownership of officers 
and directors (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2004), changes in managerial pay (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 1999, 2000; Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009), a reduction in firm leverage (Garvey 
and Hanka, 1999), a decline in firm productivity and profitability (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003), and an increase in the adoption of poison pills (Comment and Schwert, 1995). More 
recently, Francis et al. (2009) find that the state antitakeover laws led to a decrease in bond 
yields and an increase in bond prices, which they interpret as evidence that these laws reduced 
the agency cost of debt by shielding bondholders from expropriation in the event of a takeover. 
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We add to this literature by documenting the effect of the antitakeover laws on firms’ 
information environments.  
 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background on the state antitakeover laws and discusses our hypothesis development and 
empirical predictions. Section 3 describes our research design, our sample selection, and the 
measurement of key variables. Section 4 discusses our results, including a number of sensitivity 
analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Institutional background 
The regulation of U.S. corporate takeover activity dates to the passage of the Williams 
Act, a 1968 federal statute enacted to address various antitrust and antitakeover issues. 
Prohibiting “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any 
tender offer,” the Williams Act called for detailed disclosure requirements, a specific antifraud 
system, and other explicit measures to protect the shareholders of a target company during a 
tender offer. A number of states followed suit by passing their own set of statutes regulating 
antitakeover activities, which legal commentators referred to by as the “first generation” of state 
antitakeover laws.  
However, in 1982 (Edgar v. Mite Corp.), the Supreme Court found these first-generation 
laws unconstitutional, since they violated the Commerce Clause and, to a lesser extent, the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In response, a number of states passed the so-called 
“second generation” of antitakeover laws in the mid- to late 1980s, which addressed some of the 
issues the Supreme Court raised. In what many viewed as a surprise ruling, the Supreme Court 
upheld their constitutionality in 1987 in Dynamics Corp. v. CTS by ruling that state-specific 
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antitakeover laws are enforceable as long as they do not prevent compliance with the original 
Williams Act. In particular, the second-generation antitakeover laws were deemed constitutional 
since they restricted the jurisdiction of the antitakeover laws to only those firms incorporated in 
the legislating state.  
This ruling paved the way for further antitakeover legislation in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, referred to as the “third generation” of antitakeover laws, which were even more stringent 
in regulating and constraining takeover activities. The most stringent set of second- and third-
generation antitakeover laws are referred to as business combination laws, which are the focus of 
much of the literature as well as our study. 
 As Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2004) and others discuss, the second and third generation 
of antitakeover laws generally relied on some combination of the following three provisions. 
First, control share acquisition laws provide the holders of shares not held by the acquirer the 
right to decide whether the acquirer’s shares may vote on the takeover. Second, fair-price laws 
require that the acquirer pay a “fair price” for shares purchased for the takeover. Third, business 
combination laws prevent a potential acquirer from engaging in takeover activities for a specified 
period unless the target board votes otherwise. Table 1 lists the year in which the antitakeover 
laws became effective in each state (if any) and the number of unique firms in our sample that 
are incorporated in each state. In addition, we also note the provisions included in the 
antitakeover laws and state whether the laws in each state are considered “strong” or “weak” 
according to prior studies (e.g., Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). We 
use this classification in sensitivity analyses discussed further below. 
 A number of studies, mostly in the finance literature, have examined the subsequent 
economic consequences associated with the passage of the second- and third-generation 
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antitakeover laws. These studies usually fall into one of the following three categories: (1) those 
examining the impact on firms’ stock prices, (2) those examining the impact on the frequency of 
takeovers, and (3) those examining the impact on various firm-specific outcomes related to 
investments, productivity, and other corporate finance activities.6
In addition, the general conclusion of these studies is that the antitakeover laws have been 
effective as an impediment to hostile takeovers and have, to some degree, insulated managers 
from the threat of hostile takeover. Although Comment and Schwert (1995) find little evidence 
that the antitakeover laws actually reduced the frequency of takeovers, it is important to note that 
examining the effect of antitakeover laws on actual takeovers is quite challenging given the 
relatively infrequent occurrence of hostile takeovers. In addition, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) also note that it is difficult to distinguish between hostile takeovers and non-hostile 
takeovers. However, using an extended sample period, Schwert (2000) finds that takeover 
activity declined after the passage of these laws. 
 The collective evidence from 
these studies suggests that the second and third generation of antitakeover laws were effective in 
deterring takeovers, which resulted in entrenching management. In particular, Comment and 
Schwert (1995) find that takeover premiums increased following the passage of antitakeover 
laws, which is consistent with these laws’ making takeovers more costly.  
The third group of studies examines the effect of the antitakeover laws on firm-specific 
characteristics and choice variables. For example, Garvey and Hanka (1999) provide evidence 
that firms affected by second-generation antitakeover laws reduced their leverage, and Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) provide evidence on the effects of the laws on wages and firm-
level productivity. Cheng et al. (2004) find a significant reduction in the proportion of 
                                                          
6 For a summary of the papers analyzing the stock price effects of antitakeover laws, see Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1991). 
- 10 - 
 
blockholders on the board of directors as well as the stock ownership of managers. The evidence 
in Cheng et al. (2004) is consistent with managers’ tendency to reduce their ownership of stock 
following the passage of antitakeover laws since they can ensure their prior level of control by 
holding fewer (risky) shares of their firm.  
Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) examine how firms changed their CEO compensation 
practices following the passage of antitakeover laws and find an increase in CEO compensation 
and a higher sensitivity of pay to the “good luck” component of performance. Based on these 
findings, Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) conclude that CEO compensation practices and the 
disciplining effect of the market for corporate control are complementary governance 
mechanisms. Overall, the empirical evidence to date suggests that the second- and third-
generation antitakeover laws reduced the likelihood and threat of a hostile takeover.  
 The extant literature has also argued that the passage of antitakeover laws was an 
exogenous event and, as such, is a natural empirical setting for testing research questions and 
predictions that are otherwise limited because of the endogenous nature of firm-specific 
antitakeover provisions (e.g., poison pills and change in control provisions). However, there 
might be some concerns that the passage of these laws was not entirely exogenous. Romano 
(1987) specifically addresses this concern by analyzing the political context in which state 
antitakeover laws were passed. An important finding by Romano (1987) is that antitakeover laws 
were almost always exclusively promoted by a specific company that was under the threat of 
takeover and were not a result of an organized effort by firms.  
Using the law that was passed in Connecticut as an example, Romano concludes that “the 
spur behind the passage of the Connecticut law was not a broad-based political coalition. Rather, 
the bill was promoted by a corporation incorporated in Connecticut, the Aetna Life and Casualty 
- 11 - 
 
Insurance Company (Aetna).” In Arizona, the takeover bill was referred to as “the Greyhound 
Bill” since Greyhound executives were its exclusive promoter. In Missouri, Trans World Airlines 
promoted the antitakeover bill while battling activist investor Carl Icahn. These examples 
suggests that the passage of the antitakeover laws was an exogenous event to the majority of 
firms incorporated in the state and seems to be unrelated to these firms’ information 
environments. In other words, none of the evidence in the literature suggests that the reason for 
lobbying was an actual or anticipated change in firms’ information environments.  
Nevertheless, in sensitivity analyses reported below, we follow Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and estimate our primary models in event time surrounding the passage of 
the antitakeover laws. These results speak to the potential effect of lobbying (or reverse 
causality) on our reported results. Similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we find that the 
effect of the antitakeover laws on firms’ information environment occurs following their passage 
and not before, which helps to allay concerns about their validity as a source of exogenous 
variation in firms’ corporate governance structures.  
2.2. Hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Antitakeover laws, information asymmetry, and private information gathering 
Our empirical predictions about the effect of the antitakeover laws on firms’ information 
environments are based on both theory and recent empirical evidence. Two sets of economic 
theory are particularly relevant in this regard. First, Stein (1988) and Shleifer and Summers 
(1988) suggest that since antitakeover laws reduce takeover pressure, they should reduce 
managerial myopia, which could, in turn, increase the quality of financial reporting. Another set 
of theories (e.g., Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) suggests that an opaque 
information environment can serve as a form of takeover defense and, consequently, might 
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reduce takeover pressure. Therefore, if opacity in firms’ information environments and 
antitakeover laws serve as substitute mechanisms that protect firms from takeover, a change in 
the antitakeover laws might be expected to affect firms’ information environments. This change 
can take place along several dimensions, including (1) the degree of information asymmetry 
between managers and outsiders, (2) information asymmetry among investors, which manifests 
in the form of information-based trading, (3) private information flow and gathering activities, 
and (4) the informativeness of firms’ financial statements.  
The magnitude and direction of the effect of the antitakeover laws on information 
asymmetry is an empirical question. In contrast to information asymmetry for which the 
predicted relation is ambiguous, a reduction in the threat of takeovers due to the state 
antitakeover legislation should lead to less speculative trading and private information gathering 
(e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Accordingly, we predict a decrease in private information 
gathering after the passage of the laws.  
2.2.2. Antitakeover laws and financial statement informativeness 
There are several alternative channels through which the informativeness of financial 
statements might change following the passage of the antitakeover laws. First, since antitakeover 
laws shield managers from the threat of takeover, they result in greater managerial entrenchment 
and agency costs. Prior studies have argued and provided evidence that suggests that entrenched 
managers are associated with lower levels of transparency (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2008). Accordingly, the managerial entrenchment view 
predicts that managers will withhold information after the passage of the antitakeover laws and, 
consequently, their firms will have lower-quality financial reporting.  
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A second view posits that antitakeover laws insulate managers from the threat of a 
takeover, which allows them to more easily pursue the “quiet life” by making fewer investments 
and pursuing fewer of their firms’ growth options (e.g., Bertrand and Mullinathan, 2003; Giroud 
and Mueller, 2010). To the extent that managers pursue the quiet life following the passage of 
the antitakeover laws, we should observe an increase in the average quality of their firms’ 
financial reporting, since there will be less uncertainty about and variability in their future cash 
flows. Moreover, the quiet life channel also generates the cross-sectional prediction that firms at 
which managers pursue the quiet life following the passage of the state antitakeover laws should 
experience an improvement in financial reporting quality, while those firms where managers do 
not pursue the quiet life should not experience a similar improvement in their financial reporting 
quality.  
A third possibility is that the removal of the threat of takeover and the accompanying 
disciplinary forces of the market for corporate control reduces managers’ concerns for their 
future labor market prospects (Stein, 2003). This view predicts that managers will become less 
concerned about concealing poor performance and may, in fact, provide more transparent 
information. Consequently, managers might choose to simply report their firm’s true 
performance without distortion, regardless of whether it is good or bad, which would result in 
improved financial reporting quality. This channel predicts that managers with low levels of 
career concerns before the passage of the antitakeover laws will benefit less (in terms of 
increased job security) from the passage of the antitakeover laws and that firms with such 
managers should therefore not experience a change in financial reporting quality.    
A fourth possibility is that, since the market for corporate control serves as a monitoring 
mechanism (e.g., Manne, 1965; Williamson, 1983), the passage of the antitakeover laws results 
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in less managerial monitoring. If financial statements assist the firm’s other stakeholders (e.g., 
analysts, institutional owners, shareholders, and regulators) in their monitoring activities, then 
managers might want to voluntarily improve their financial reporting quality following the 
passage of the antitakeover laws to allow for better monitoring (i.e., to restore the overall level of 
external monitoring back to its previous level). For example, if a firm is more dependent on the 
equity market for capital, then it will now have an incentive to be more transparent to signal its 
type to shareholders (e.g., Ruland et al., 1990; Marquardt and Weidman, 1998; and Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000). We refer to this potential effect as the signaling channel, and it predicts that 
firms that are more dependent on equity financing are the ones that experience the greatest 
improvement in their financial reporting quality following the passage of the antitakeover laws.  
An alternative way to characterize the relation between antitakeover legislation and 
firms’ reporting practices is to view the evolution of financial reporting practices and the strength 
of the market for corporate control as jointly determined. In this case, a shock to the strength of 
the market for corporate control should result in changes to the level of financial reporting. 
However, the direction of the change is ambiguous, because financial reporting is both an input 
to, and an outcome of, different governance mechanisms. Since increased transparency is one 
mechanism by which managers can ex ante commit against taking actions that are detrimental to 
shareholders and other parties that contract with the firm (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010), one can 
argue that the passage of antitakeover laws should result in an increase in corporate transparency. 
Alternatively, since the antitakeover laws insulate managers from discipline from the market for 
corporate control, they might instead reduce their incentives to be transparent. Given these 
different predictions, the effect of antitakeover laws on financial statement informativeness is, to 
a large extent, an empirical question. 
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2.2.3. Antitakeover laws and analyst behavior 
A final channel through which the state antitakeover laws can affect firms’ information 
environments is through their effect on the level of analyst coverage and their forecast properties. 
On one hand, as previously discussed, a reduction in the threat of takeover reduces incentives for 
private information gathering about the probability of takeover, which, in turn, reduces the 
amount of speculative trade. Since analysts have incentives to gather private information, 
especially about important events such as mergers and acquisitions and takeovers, the passage of 
the antitakeover laws should reduce analysts’ incentives to gather private information, and, 
consequently, analysts may reduce their coverage of firms. On the other hand, if analysts serve as 
a mechanism to monitor managers, then analyst coverage may increase following the passage of 
antitakeover laws (e.g., Yu, 2008).7
We also predict that analyst earnings forecast errors will change following the passage of 
the laws. Information provided by firms is an important input to analysts’ forecasting models. 
Accordingly, if firms provide better information in response to the laws, then we expect analyst 
forecast errors to decrease. Alternatively, if firms provide less transparent information in 
response to the laws, we expect analyst earnings forecast errors to increase.  
  
 
                                                          
7 The role of financial analysts in corporate governance is not clear ex ante. Although analysts might serve as 
monitors of managers, they might also put more pressure on managers to engage in earnings management to meet or 
beat forecasts. Yu (2008) examines this possibility empirically and finds that firms followed by more analysts 
engage in less earnings management. This evidence is consistent with a monitoring role of analysts, which might be 
expected to change after the passage of antitakeover laws, since these laws reduced the efficacy of an important 
monitoring mechanism (i.e., the market for corporate control).  
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3. Research Design, Sample Selection, and Variable Measurement 
3.1 Research design 
We use the passage of state antitakeover laws as a source of exogenous variation in an 
important corporate governance mechanism with which we identify the effect of governance on 
firms’ information environments. Although we use a number of alternative proxies for the 
information environment, our basic research design entails estimating the following equation:  
jtijtitjtitji XERANTITAKEOVy ,,,,,1,, εγβλα ++++=                                      (1) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes state of incorporation and t indexes time, y is the dependent 
variable of interest and represents one of the proxies for the information environment, α is the 
firm fixed effect, λ is the time fixed effect, ANTITAKEOVER is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if antitakeover laws are in effect in state j during year t and zero otherwise, and X is 
a vector of control variables. 
Equation (1) essentially represents a differences-in-differences specification that is 
similar to the one in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). As Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004) discuss, the differences-in-differences approach has become an increasingly popular 
research design for identifying causal effects. To better understand the specification in Equation 
(1), consider the following example within a potential outcomes framework.8
                                                          
8 Following Rubin (1974), this framework is referred to as the potential outcomes framework because, for any firm, 
it is possible to observe only one outcome and not the other. For example, a researcher can observe the information 
environment of a firm incorporated in a state that passed antitakeover laws but cannot observe the information 
environment of the same firm incorporated in the same state that did not pass antitakeover laws at the same point in 
time. The latter outcome that did not occur is referred to as the “counterfactual” outcome, and its unobservability 
creates an identification problem that precludes determining the causal effect of the antitakeover laws (or some other 
treatment of interest) for a specific firm. A differences-in-differences research design therefore imposes identifying 
assumptions, which are necessary to document causal effects.  
 Let y1i,j,t denote the 
information environment of firm i, incorporated in state j, during period t if there are 
antitakeover laws in effect in the state of incorporation during the period, and let y0i,j,t denote the 
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information environment of firm i, incorporated in state j, during period t if there are no 
antitakeover laws in effect in the state of incorporation during the period. These are referred to as 
potential outcomes, because a given state can either have passed or not have passed antitakeover 
laws at time t. Therefore, for any firm, it is possible to observe only one or the other, but not both 
(e.g., y1i,j,t is observed for firm i if it is incorporated in Pennsylvania (PA) in 1998, since 
antitakeover laws were in effect in that state at that time as indicated in Table 1, but y0i,j,t would 
have been observed if Pennsylvania did not have antitakeover laws in effect during 1998). 
Assuming that𝐸�𝑦1𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑦0𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|𝑗, 𝑡� is constant and denoted by β, firm i’s observed information 
environment, yi,j,t, can be written as follows:9
jtitjtitji ERANTITAKEOVy ,,,1,, εβλα +++=
    
                                                (2) 
We can now examine the difference in information environments of firms incorporated in the 
state of Pennsylvania around the passage of its antitakeover laws in 1987 as 
  (3) 
And the difference in the information environment of firms incorporated in another state, say, 
Vermont (VT), which did not have antitakeover laws in places during that period, as: 
                 (4) 
So, the population difference-in-differences becomes: 
{ }
{ } β===−==
−==−==
]1987,|[]1988,|[
]1987,|[]1988,|[
,,,,
,,,,
tVTjyEtVTjyE
tPAjyEtPAjyE
tjitji
tjitji
     (5) 
which is the causal effect of the antitakeover law of interest in our study. In particular, the first 
difference compares the information environment of firms incorporated in Pennsylvania before 
and after the passage of the antitakeover laws and the second difference compares the change in 
                                                          
9 Note that Equation (2) is identical to Equation (1) but without the control variables. 
βλλ +−===−== 19871988,,,, ]1987,|[]1988,|[ tPAjyEtPAjyE tjitji
19871988,,,, ]1987,|[]1988,|[ λλ −===−== tVTjyEtVTjyE tjitji
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the information environment of firms incorporated in Vermont (which did not have antitakeover 
laws in place) during the same period. This approach illustrates that the identifying assumption 
in this research design is that trends in the outcome of interest would have been the same in both 
states absent the passage of antitakeover laws. In other words, it is the trend in the outcome 
variable of interest in states that did not have antitakeover laws in effect during a given period 
that serves as the counterfactual outcome with which we identify the causal effect of the state 
antitakeover laws on firms’ information environments. 
Although a simple comparison of average differences as in Equation (5) is one way to 
implement a differences-in-differences research design, it does not allow for control variables 
that are likely to affect firms’ information environments, nor is it amenable to examining 
multiple states that might have passed antitakeover laws at different times. We therefore estimate 
the regression analog that is given by Equation (1), which allows for control variables and for 
different states that passed antitakeover laws at different times. As Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) note, the staggered passage of the antitakeover laws means that our control group is not 
restricted to states that never passed antitakeover laws. Instead, the control group includes all the 
firms incorporated in states not passing an antitakeover law at time t, even if their state of 
incorporation has already passed, or will pass (sometime after time t), antitakeover laws.  
We also follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and control for local and industry 
shocks by including a full set of time-varying industry-year and state-year controls, which are 
computed as the mean of the dependent variable in the firm’s three-digit SIC industry and state 
of incorporation, respectively, in a given year, excluding the firm itself. Controlling for local and 
industry effects helps to separate out the effects of industry and geographic shocks that are 
contemporaneous with the antitakeover laws from the effects of the laws themselves. Consistent 
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with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we also add firm and year fixed effects to control for 
time and year effects that are likely to be present. 
Finally, we follow Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and report standard errors that are clustered by the state of incorporation. 
Together with the firm and time fixed effects, this approach accounts for correlations of the error 
terms (1) across different firms in a given state of incorporation and year (i.e., cross-sectional 
correlation), (2) across different firms in a given state of incorporation over time (i.e., across-
firm serial correlation), and (3) within the same firm over time (i.e., within-firm serial 
correlation) (Petersen, 2009). 
3.2. Sample selection 
Our sample draws from Compustat, CRSP, Thomson Financial Insider Filings, and 
I/B/E/S, as well as the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) and the Trades and 
Automated Quotes (TAQ) databases. Because the required variables differ across our tests, we 
require only the availability of the necessary variables for a given test. This approach ensures 
that we use the largest sample available for each test. However, we also conduct a sensitivity 
analysis using the sample that results from the intersection of all variables, and we find that our 
results continue to hold. In addition, because the constitutionality of second-generation state 
antitakeover laws was uncertain until 1987 (i.e., the Supreme Court ruling in the case of CTS vs. 
Dynamics Corp.), we examine the sample between 1987 and 2000.10
3.3. Variable measurement 
  
3.3.1. Information asymmetry 
We use three proxies to capture information asymmetry. First, following prior literature 
(e.g., Brennan and Subramanyam, 1996), we use the adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
                                                          
10 Our results are similar when we use an expanded sample period from 1985 and 2000. 
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spread. This variable measures the extent to which prices are affected by unexpected order flow 
and is increasing in the level of information asymmetry among investors. We estimate the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, LAMBDA, following Madhavan, Richardson, 
and Roomans (1997) as modified by Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia (2011) to take 
into account cross-sectional differences in firm size. To estimate LAMBDA, we gather trade-by-
trade and quote data from the ISSM and TAQ databases. We match trades and quotes using the 
Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm with a five second lag to infer the direction of the trade (i.e., 
buy or sell). Once trades are classified as either buyer- or seller-initiated, we estimate the 
following firm-specific regression using all transactions available during the month: 
Δpt/pt-1 = ψ ΔDt + λ (Dt – ρDt-1) + ut ,               (6) 
where pt is the transaction price, Dt is the sign of trade (+1 if buy and -1 if sell), and ρ is the 
AR(1) coefficient for Dt. We measure LAMBDA (λ) once a year in March, using all intraday data 
for that month to estimate Equation (6) for each firm in the sample.  
Our second measure of information asymmetry is the Probability of Informed Trade 
(PIN) measure developed by Easley et al. (2002). This measure was obtained from Soeren 
Hvidkjaer’s website and is available annually each December. PIN has been widely used in 
recent studies as a proxy for information asymmetry (e.g., LaFond and Watts, 2008; Mohanram 
and Rajgopal, 2009; Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia, 2011).  
For our third measure, we use the intensity of insider trades to capture the degree of 
information asymmetry that exists between insiders and outsiders. We follow prior literature 
(Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Frankel and Li, 2004) and compute the net purchase ratio (NPR) to 
measure the direction of insider trading (i.e., whether insiders are buying or selling) during a 
given year. NPR is computed by dividing the net purchases (i.e., shares purchased less shares 
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sold) by an insider during a given year by the total number of insider transactions over the same 
period. We use Thomson Financial insider-trading data to construct this measure. 
3.3.2. Private information gathering 
 Following Ferreira and Laux (2007), we use idiosyncratic volatility, SIGMA, as a proxy 
for private information gathering. We measure SIGMA for each firm, each month, by estimating 
the following regression of daily stock returns on the four Fama-French factors.  
iUMDiHMLiSMBiMKTiidi UMDHMLSMBMKTt εββββα +++++= ,,,,,Re       (7) 
where Ret is the return for stock i in excess of the risk-free rate on day d, and MKT, SMB, HML, 
and UMD are the four Fama-French factors. We then define each firm’s relative idiosyncratic 
volatility, or SIGMA, as 1-R2, where R2 is obtained from the above firm-specific regression. 
Given the bounded nature of R2, we use the logistic transformation of  SIGMA in our empirical 
tests.  
This measure is well established in the corporate finance literature and is based on 
strategic trading models and the associated empirical evidence that establishes that informed 
trade induces idiosyncratic volatility in stock returns (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; French 
and Roll, 1986). In addition, Roll (1988) focuses specifically on idiosyncratic volatility, 
providing evidence that idiosyncratic price changes mainly reflect private information being 
incorporated into stock prices by informed trading rather than public information. Accordingly, 
idiosyncratic volatility is a suitable summary measure of the flow of private information about 
the firm. 
3.3.3. Financial statement informativeness 
We use two alternative proxies to examine the effect of the antitakeover laws on the 
degree of financial statement informativeness. First, we employ a measure of the value relevance 
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of financial statements (e.g., Francis and Schipper 1999; Frankel and Li, 2004), RSQ, which is 
measured as the adjusted-R2 from the following firm-specific time-series regression: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (8) 
where Pi,t is the price per share of firm i three months after fiscal year end t, Ei,t is the earnings 
per share of firm i during year t, and BVi,t is the book value per share of firm i at the end of year 
t. We estimate Equation (8) as a rolling regression from time t-10 to t and require that firms have 
a minimum of five annual observations to be included in the sample.  
One issue with this proxy is that it is based on market price and therefore may be affected 
by changes to price dispersion after the passage of antitakeover laws that are unrelated to the 
informativeness of either earnings or book value of equity (i.e., financial statement variables). In 
other words, the removal of the threat of a takeover following the passage of the antitakeover 
laws results in less uncertainty about firms’ future operations and cash flows, which might 
produce a mechanical improvement in firms’ financial reporting quality.  
We address this concern in two ways. First, we examine whether this mechanical relation 
between RSQ and probability of takeover exists. We do this by first estimating the ex ante 
probability of takeover for each firm-year in our sample period, which is calculated as the 
predicted value from the logistic regression specified in Cremers, Nair, and John (2009).11
                                                          
11 In particular, we estimate a logistic regression of the probability of takeover: Pr(Takeover = 1) = f(Q, PPE, 
Industry, Cash, Firm Size, Block, Leverage, ROA, Year Indicators). Takeover is an indicator that takes a value of 
one if the firm was the target of a hostile takeover during the year and zero otherwise where takeovers are identified 
from the SDC database. Q is the ratio of the market-to-book value of assets where the market value of assets is 
defined as the book value of total assets plus the market value of common stock minus the book value of common 
equity and deferred taxes. PPE is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Industry is an indicator 
that takes a value of one if there was a takeover in the firm’s industry (based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications) during the prior year and zero otherwise. Cash is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total 
assets. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. Block is an indicator that takes a value 
of one if at least one institutional investor holds more than 5% of the firm’s shares and  otherwise. Leverage is the 
ratio of debt to total assets. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to average total assets. Year 
Indicators are also included in the specification. The variables Q, PPE, Cash, Leverage, and ROA are industry 
adjusted based on the annual industry average value.  
 We 
then group firm-years into terciles based on their probability of takeover and designate these 
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groups as having either a low, medium, or high probability of takeover. If the mapping of 
earnings and book value of equity into price is affected by the probability of a takeover, then the 
RSQ measure should be different across these three groups (i.e., the RSQ measure should differ 
based on differences in the probability of takeover). In untabulated results, we find that the mean 
RSQ is not significantly different (based on an F-test) across the three terciles, which suggests 
that the mapping of earnings and book value of equity into price is not different for firms with 
different probabilities of takeover. This finding mitigates concerns that the RSQ measure of 
financial statement informativeness exhibits a mechanical relation with the probability of 
takeover and, therefore, the antitakeover laws. 
Second, we use an alternative measure of financial statement informativeness, EQ, which 
is based on the association between accruals and cash flows, and does not rely on the relation 
between financial statement variables and stock prices.12
   
 A larger deviation between accruals and 
cash flows is interpreted as lower quality of accounting information. Following Barth et al. 
(2001), we decompose total accruals into their primary components and examine how well they 
predict future cash flows from operations. Our empirical measure is based on the absolute value 
of the residuals from the following model, estimated annually for each industry based on Fama 
and French (1997) 48-Industry Classification:  
it
tititititi
OTHERAMORTDEPR
APINVARCFCF
εφφφ
φφφφφ
++++
∆+∆+∆++=+
876
,5,4,3,211,            (9) 
                                                          
12 Although measures of financial statement informativeness that are not based on market price (e.g., EQ) should be 
less susceptible to concerns about a potential mechanical relation with the probability of takeover, there is still the 
possibility that such a relation exists. For example, takeovers give rise to goodwill, and any associated future 
writeoffs could weaken the relation between current earnings and future cash flows. Further, the coefficient on 
AMORT will be affected. Therefore, we repeat all of our tabulated analyses that use EQ as the measure of financial 
statement informativeness after eliminating any firm-years that had a merger or acquisition in the previous five 
years. We find that our results are unchanged, which also allays concerns about a mechanical relation between the 
probability of takeover and EQ driving our results.  
- 24 - 
 
where CF is net cash flow from operating activities (Compustat Data308) less the accrual portion 
of the extraordinary items and discontinued operations reported on the statement of cash flows 
(Compustat Data124), ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable per the statement of cash flows 
(Compustat Data302), ΔINV is the change in inventory per the statement of cash flows 
(Compustat Data303), ΔAP is the change in accounts payable per the statement of cash flows 
(Compustat Data304), DEPR is depreciation expense (Compustat Data103), and AMORT is the 
amortization expense (Compustat Data65). OTHER is the net of all other accruals calculated as 
EARN – (CF + ΔAR + ΔINV - ΔAP – DEPR – AMORT), where EARN is income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat Data18). 
3.3.4. Analyst Behavior  
We examine changes in (1) the extent of analyst forecast coverage, COVERAGE, (2) 
disagreement among analysts’ annual EPS forecasts, DISPERSION, and (3) the earnings forecast 
error, AF_ERROR, based on annual EPS forecasts. We measure COVERAGE as the number of 
estimates in the most recent annual EPS forecast before the fiscal year end. We measure 
DISPERSION as the standard deviation of the most recent annual EPS forecast scaled by the 
mean estimate of the last annual EPS forecast before the fiscal year end. We measure 
AF_ERROR as the absolute value of the difference between mean EPS estimate and the actual 
EPS scaled by firm size, which is measured using the natural logarithm of total assets. All 
analyst data are obtained from I/B/E/S. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Antitakeover laws and information asymmetry 
Table 3 presents the results of the effects of the antitakeover laws on firms’ information 
environments using three alternative information asymmetry proxies. 13  As discussed in the 
previous section, we consider LAMBDA and PIN to be measures of information asymmetry 
among investors and NPR to be a measure of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders.14
An additional variable of interest is idiosyncratic volatility, since this variable captures 
the flow of private information to the capital markets (Roll, 1988; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). 
Private information flow is an important determinant of information asymmetry, and higher 
idiosyncratic volatility indicates more private information flowing into stock prices, resulting in 
a reduction in information asymmetry. As previous research suggests (e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 
2007), takeover activity creates incentives to collect private information, which, in turn, leads to 
higher idiosyncratic volatility. The results in the last column of Table 3 indicate that private 
information flow (measured by SIGMA) decreased following the passage of the antitakeover 
laws. This finding implies that private information gathering decreased following the passage of 
 In all three columns, we find that the estimated coefficient on ANTITAKEOVER is 
negative and significant, indicating that information asymmetry among investors and information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders both declined following the passage of the 
antitakeover laws.  
                                                          
13 It is important to note that firms may have responded to the passage of the antitakeover laws with changes in other 
governance mechanisms to restore the overall corporate governance system to its optimal level. For example, 
following the passage of antitakeover laws, a firm might have increased the proportion of outside directors on its 
board to facilitate better monitoring of management (Williamson, 1983). It is also important to note that such a 
change in alternative governance mechanisms does not limit our analysis and inferences, because we are interested 
in documenting the net effect of the antitakeover laws on firms’ information environments, regardless of the channel 
through which these effects came about.  
14 Although information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and information asymmetry among investors are 
two different constructs, they are likely to be correlated (Cai et al., 2009). The (Pearson) correlations in our sample 
are 0.14 between PIN and NPR, 0.40 between LAMBDA and PIN and 0.08 between NPR and PIN.  
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these antitakeover laws, possibly because the lower probability of a takeover associated with the 
laws reduced the gains to collecting private information on the likelihood of a takeover (Ferreira 
and Laux, 2007). Moreover, when considered along with the previous evidence that information 
asymmetry decreased following the passage of these laws, it suggests that a reduction in private 
information gathering was not the source of the observed decrease in information asymmetry. 
Prior studies that use the passage of state antitakeover laws as a source of exogenous 
change to firms’ governance structures entertain the possibility that the passage of these laws 
was not exogenous, but was instead the result of lobbying by firms that were thought to benefit 
from their enactment (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Although including the state-year and 
industry-year controls mitigates concerns that the passage of the antitakeover laws was the 
outcome of broad-based lobbying at the state and industry level, it is possible that lobbying 
occurred at the state-of-incorporation level and that the statutes adopted depended directly on the 
common economic prospects and information environments of all firms in the state. We next 
consider the issue of reverse causality.  
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we replace the ANTITAKEOVER indicator 
in Equation (1) with the following four indicator variables: ANTITAKEOVER(−1), 
ANTITAKEOVER(0), ANTITAKEOVER(1), and ANTITAKEOVER(2+), where 
ANTITAKEOVER(−1) is an event time indicator that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a 
state one year before the passage of its antitakeover laws, ANTITAKEOVER(0) is an indicator 
that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state during the year of the passage of its 
antitakeover laws, and ANTITAKEOVER(1) and ANTITAKEOVER(2+) are indicators that equal 
one if the firm is incorporated in a state in the year following the passage of its antitakeover laws 
or two or more years following the passage of its antitakeover laws, respectively. If the 
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antitakeover laws were passed in response to political pressure of a broad coalition of firms, then 
the “effect” of the laws should precede their passage. Alternatively, if their passage was a 
relatively exogenous event for most firms (as argued by Romano, 1987 and others), then their 
effect should be detected only after they became effective. In other words, if the laws were 
exogenous, we should find significant coefficients only for ANTITAKEOVER(0), 
ANTITAKEOVER(1), and ANTITAKEOVER(2+). The results in Table 4 reveal that the effect of 
the laws never preceded their passage using any of the three measures of information asymmetry 
or idiosyncratic volatility. The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with prior literature and 
suggest that the passage of the antitakeover laws was relatively exogenous rather than in 
response to lobbying by a broad subset of the firms in our sample. 
4.2. Antitakeover laws and financial statement informativeness 
Our first set of results indicates that information asymmetry decreased following the 
passage of the antitakeover laws. In this section, we examine the extent to which public 
information provided by firms contributed to this decrease by examining the effect of 
antitakeover laws on financial statement informativeness. We first examine whether the price 
informativeness of financial statements, defined as the adjusted-R2 from a firm-specific time-
series regression of price on earnings and book value of equity, changed following the enactment 
of the antitakeover laws. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that the coefficient on 
ANTITAKEOVER is positive and significant, which indicates that the price informativeness of 
financial statements (i.e., earnings and book value) increased following the passage of the 
antitakeover laws.  
As noted earlier, one concern with the preceding analysis is that it relies on a stock price-
based measure and therefore may be affected by changes to price dispersion after the passage of 
antitakeover laws that is unrelated to the informativeness of either earnings or book value of 
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equity.15
4.3. Antitakeover laws and analyst behavior 
 We address this concern by using Barth et al.’s (2001) measure of earnings quality, EQ, 
as an alternative proxy for financial statement informativeness. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 
show that the coefficient on ANTITAKEOVER is negative and significant, indicating that 
financial reporting informativeness increased following the passage of the antitakeover laws. 
Collectively, the evidence in Table 5 indicates that the informativeness of financial statements 
(i.e., public information provided by the firms) increased following the passage of the 
antitakeover laws.  
Another channel through which antitakeover laws may affect the level of information 
asymmetry is the activity of financial analysts. Analysts collect private information as well as 
interpret public information and therefore have a direct effect on the level of information 
asymmetry between the firm and outsiders. We therefore examine the effect of state antitakeover 
laws on analyst coverage as well as the properties of analyst earnings forecasts. In particular, we 
examine changes in (1) the extent of analyst forecast coverage, COVERAGE, (2) disagreement 
among analysts’ annual EPS forecasts, DISPERSION, and (3) the earnings forecast error, 
AF_ERROR, based on annual EPS forecasts.  
The first column of Table 6 indicates that analyst coverage declined following the 
enactment of antitakeover laws. The second and third columns show that the size of the forecast 
error and level of disagreement among analysts also declined following the passage of the 
antitakeover laws. Collectively, this evidence indicates that although the number of analysts 
declined following the passage of antitakeover laws, the extent of their disagreement declined 
and their forecast accuracy improved. This evidence also suggests that the reduction in the level 
of information asymmetry documented in our previous tests is not a result of increased analyst 
                                                          
15 For example, less speculative trading may reduce the dispersion of stock prices. 
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coverage, but is instead consistent with firms supplying higher-quality financial information, 
which reduced disagreement among analysts and improved the accuracy of their forecasts. This 
finding is consistent with our prior results on the various measures of private information flow. 
4.4. Testing competing hypotheses related to financial statement informativeness 
 As discussed in Section 2.2.2, to discriminate among the competing explanations for why 
firms’ quality of financial reporting might have changed following the passage of the 
antitakeover laws, we estimate a number of additional cross-sectional tests. First, we identify 
firms that pursued the so-called “quiet life” following the passage of antitakeover laws. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2010) we use several alternative measures 
of investment to determine whether each firm-year had positive or negative industry- and state-
adjusted growth in (1) assets (Compustat data6), (2) PP&E (Compustat data8), (3) COGS 
(Compustat data41), and (4) advertising expenses (Compustat data45). Managers of firms with 
negative industry- and state-adjusted growth in these variables are classified as pursuing the 
quiet life. We then estimate Equation (2) with the financial statement informativeness variable 
EQ as the dependent variable for each of these subsamples. Results presented in Table 7 indicate 
that firms in both subsamples experienced a significant improvement in EQ following the 
passage of the antitakeover laws, which suggests that managers’ pursuit of the quiet life does not 
appear to be responsible for the observed improvement in firms’ financial reporting quality.16
Our next test examines whether the career concerns view accounts for the observed 
improvement in financial statement informativeness. We use a firm’s ex ante probability of 
takeover as a proxy for the level of career concerns that managers face before passage of the 
antitakeover laws. Higher ex ante probability of takeover suggests a higher level of career 
 
                                                          
16 In untabulated tests, we find similar results when LAMBDA is the dependent variable. This result is consistent 
with an improvement in the aggregate information environment of both subsamples of firms following the passage 
of the antitakeover laws. 
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concern.17
Finally, to test the signaling hypothesis that firms supply higher-quality financial 
statements following the passage of the antitakeover laws to signal their “type” to shareholders, 
we require a measure of firms’ dependence on the equity market as a source of financing. We 
follow Fama and French (2008) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) and calculate net 
equity issues as the ratio of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t−1 to 
the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year t−2. We then classify firms that 
have a net equity issuance value greater than or equal to one as “Net Equity Issuers.” We then 
estimate Equation (2) with the financial statement informativeness variable EQ as the dependent 
variable for each of these subsamples. The results are presented in Table 9 and show that the 
improvement in financial reporting quality (EQ) occurred only in the subsample of firms that are 
net equity issuers and are therefore more likely to depend on equity markets as a source of 
capital. This result is consistent with Ruland et al. (1990), Marquardt and Weidman (1998), and 
Lang and Lundholm (2000), who present evidence that firms accessing capital markets tend to 
 Specifically, we test for evidence of the career concerns explanation by partitioning 
our sample based on firms’ ex ante probability of takeover, PROBABILITY, estimated as the 
predicted value from the logistic regression specified in Cremers et al. (2009). The results are 
presented in Table 8 and show that ANTITAKEOVER is negative and significant in both the 
subsample of firms with a relatively low probability of takeover (and, therefore, the managers of 
which are not expected to benefit as much from the passage of the antitakeover laws) and the 
subsample of firms with a relatively high probability of takeover. Overall, the results in Table 8 
suggest that the improvement in financial reporting quality was not due to changes in managers’ 
career concerns that might have resulted from the passage of the antitakeover laws. 
                                                          
17 An alternative proxy for career concern would be CEO’s age. However, we are unable to obtain this information 
for the sample period in this study. 
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provide higher-quality information. In the context of our study, this result suggests that firms that 
are more likely to issue equity are the firms that account for the average improvement in 
financial reporting quality following the passage of the state antitakeover laws.  
4.5. Additional analyses 
4.5.1. Alternative specification for financial statement informativeness 
In this section, we adopt an alternative research design that is different from the 
differences-in-differences approach that we used to examine the effect of the antitakeover laws 
on financial statement informativeness. Specifically, we examine the differential informativeness 
of earnings before and after the passage of the antitakeover laws by estimating the slope 
coefficients from a regression of annual stock returns on annual earnings. Following Easton and 
Harris (1991), we estimate the following equation:18
   
 
ijtitjtititijt XERANTITAKEOVEARNEARNt εγββα ++++= *Re 21                (10) 
 where i indexes firms, j indexes state of incorporation, t indexes time, and Ret is the 15-month 
cumulative raw return during the interval that begins three months following the end of fiscal 
year t-1 and ends six months after the end of fiscal year t.19
                                                          
18 Our results are similar if we include both levels as well as changes in earnings. 
 ANTITAKEOVER is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if antitakeover laws are in effect in state j during year t and zero 
otherwise, X is a vector of control variables, and EARN is earnings (Compustat data18) for fiscal 
year t scaled by assets (Compustat data6) at the end of fiscal year t-1. The coefficient of interest 
is EARN*ANTITAKEOVER, which captures the effect of the antitakeover laws on the earnings-
return relation. The results presented in Column (1) of Table 10 indicate that 
19 We obtain similar results if we cumulate returns over the 12-month period beginning three months after the end of 
fiscal year t-1 and ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 
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EARN*ANTITAKEOVER is positive and significant, indicating that earnings became more 
informative following the passage of antitakeover laws.20
To identify the source of this increased informativeness, we next examine whether 
managers used the discretion inherent in financial reporting to provide more private information 
through the use of accruals. Prior studies suggest that managers use their reporting discretion to 
signal their private information through accruals (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Guay et al., 
1996). Specifically, in making discretionary accrual choices, which are inherently subjective, 
managers may incorporate their private information in the financial reports to credibly convey 
this information to financial statement users and improve the informativeness of reported 
accounting numbers (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Bernard and Skinner, 1996; 
Subramanyam, 1996). 
  
In the second column, we decompose earnings into their cash flow and accrual 
components, and we interact each of these variables with ANTITAKEOVER. In the third and 
fourth columns, we further decompose total accruals into their discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components according to either the Jones (1991) model or the performance-
matched discretionary accruals model of Kothari et al. (2005), respectively. The Jones model 
                                                          
20 Similar to the concern noted above about how changes in the probability of takeover might induce a mechanical 
change in the RSQ measure of financial statement informativeness, the dependent variable in this test is returns, 
which is a function of price and therefore might also be affected by a mechanical relation between the probability of 
takeover and the variability of prices. To address this concern, we calculate the ex ante probability of takeover for 
each firm-year (based on Cremers et al., 2009) and rank observations into terciles according to whether they have a 
low, medium, or high probability of takeover. We then interact the tercile rank of the probability of takeover with 
earnings (EARN), antitakeover (ANTITAKEOVER), and the earnings-antitakeover interaction 
(EARN*ANTITAKEOVER). This is a more general specification that allows the relation between earnings and 
returns to differ according to differences in the probability of takeover both before and after the passage of the 
antitakeover laws. We find that none of the three additional interactions is significantly different from zero, which 
indicates that the mapping between earnings and returns was not different either before or after the passage of the 
antitakeover laws as a function of the probability of takeover. In addition, we continue to find that the coefficient on 
the EARN*ANTITAKEOVER interaction is positive and significant. Collectively, these results suggest that the 
earnings-returns relation strengthened following the passage of the antitakeover laws and that this change was not 
due to a mechanical relation between the probability of takeover and returns.   
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uses the residuals from the following equation estimated annually for each industry based on the 
two-digit SIC:  
it
ti
it
ti
it
ti
t
it
Assets
PPEk
Assets
vk
Assets
k
Assets
TA
ti
ε++
∆
+=
−−−− 1,
3
1,
2
1,
1
Re1
1,                        (11) 
where TA is total accruals, which is calculated as the difference between net income (Compustat 
Data18) and cash flow from operations (Compustat Data308), Assets is total assets (Compustat 
Data6), ∆REV is change in sales (Compustat Data12), PPE is the net book value of property, 
plant, and equipment (Compustat Data8), and i and t index the firm and year, respectively.  
Our second measure of discretionary accruals is the performance-adjusted abnormal 
accruals measure developed by Kothari et al. (2005). This measure also uses the residuals from 
the following equation, which is also estimated annually for each industry based on the two-digit 
SIC: 
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where ROA is the return on assets computed as net income scaled by total assets, i and t index the 
firm and year, respectively, and the other variables are as previously defined.  
The results in the second column of Table 10, where earnings are disaggregated into their 
cash flow and total accrual components, indicate that the increased informativeness of earnings 
following the passage of the antitakeover laws is attributable to the increased informativeness of 
accruals rather than cash flows. In particular, the coefficient on the interaction between total 
accruals and ANTITAKEOVER is positive and significant, but the interaction between cash flows 
and ANTITAKEOVER is statistically indistinguishable from zero. When we further disaggregate 
total accruals into their discretionary and nondiscretionary components according to the Jones 
model in the third column, we find that the increased informativeness of earnings following the 
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passage of the antitakeover laws is attributable to the discretionary rather than the 
nondiscretionary component of accruals. When we use the performance-matched discretionary 
accruals model of Kothari et al. (2005), we find that both components of total accruals became 
more informative following the passage of the antitakeover laws. Overall, the evidence in Table 
10 indicates that the accrual, rather than the cash flow component of earnings, is the source of 
the increased returns-earnings relation following the passage of the antitakeover laws. In 
addition, the evidence in Table 10 is consistent with managers’ use of their discretion in financial 
reporting to convey more information to the capital markets following the passage of the 
antitakeover laws. 
4.5.2. Strength of antitakeover laws  
 As discussed in Section 2.1, there is variation across states in the strength of their 
antitakeover laws, suggesting that their effect on firms’ information environments might be 
expected to differ. There are two alternative approaches to classify the various state antitakeover 
laws as either “strong” or “weak.” One classification is based on prior studies such as Francis et 
al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2004), which considers a particular state antitakeover law to be 
strong if it contains more than two provisions and weak if it has only one or two provisions. 
Although this classification is objective, it ignores intricacies in the laws and their 
enforcement. 21
                                                          
21 For example, Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 is widely regarded as the most stringent of the second-generation 
antitakeover laws and includes five provisions, including control shares, disgorgement, fiduciary duty, employee 
severance compensation, and labor contracts. Although this specific bill consists of five different provisions, it is 
accepted that it really includes only three major provisions, as the employee compensation and labor contract 
provisions are triggered by the share control approval provision. 
 The second classification is based SharkRepellent.net, which provides a 
comprehensive database of the various state antitakeover statutes, including a detailed analysis of 
whether a particular state’s antitakeover laws are strong or weak. We adopt both approaches for 
classifying the various state antitakeover laws.  
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In an adapted version of Equation (1), we partition the ANTITAKEOVER indicator into 
STRONG_ANTITAKEOVER and WEAK_ANTITAKEOVER, which take values of one if the firm-
year is from a state with either strong or weak antitakeover laws, respectively, in effect during 
the year and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are the measures of financial statement 
informativeness as well as the three measures of information asymmetry. In untabulated results, 
we find that, on average, the information environment of firms in states with stronger 
antitakeover laws improved more than the information environment of firms in states with 
weaker antitakeover laws.  
4.5.3. Delaware incorporation  
One concern with any study that examines the effect of state antitakeover laws is that a 
majority of U.S. publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware. It is therefore 
reasonable to ask whether the effect of the antitakeover laws is concentrated in firms 
incorporated in Delaware (in which case there is an identification problem that precludes 
identifying whether the effects are attributable to the antitakeover laws or being incorporated in 
Delaware) or whether the effects also occur in other states. To address this concern, we partition 
the ANTITAKEOVER indicator into DE_ANTITAKEOVER and OTHER_ANTITAKEOVER, 
which take values of one if the firm-year is from Delaware or another state with antitakeover 
laws, respectively, during a year in which antitakeover laws were in effect and zero otherwise. 
Untabulated results indicate that the effect of the antitakeover laws on the information 
asymmetry measures is not due solely to the firms incorporated in Delaware, but is also found in 
firms incorporated in other states that also passed antitakeover laws.  
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5. Conclusion 
We use changes in state antitakeover laws as source of exogenous variation in an 
important corporate governance mechanism (i.e., the market for corporate control) to examine 
the causal relation between firms’ corporate governance structures and their information 
environments. Using a number of alternative proxies for firms’ information environments, we 
find that the level of information asymmetry decreased, private information collection activities 
decreased, and the level of financial statement informativeness increased following the passage 
of the antitakeover laws. Consistent with the theories of Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989), our evidence suggests that information quality serves as a substitute for an 
important governance mechanism (i.e., monitoring from the market for corporate control). 
Although we focus on the direct effect of antitakeover laws on firms’ information 
environments, there are a number of potential indirect effects that might warrant future research. 
In particular, firms might have responded to the weakening of the market for corporate control 
by implementing alternative governance mechanisms with different informational requirements. 
For example, Williamson (1983) suggests that the market for corporate control and monitoring 
by the board of directors are substitute governance mechanisms. Therefore, if firms responded to 
the weakened capital market monitoring with greater internal monitoring in the form of either 
more or a higher proportion of outside directors, these directors would be likely to require 
higher-quality information to effectively discharge their monitoring duties (Armstrong et al., 
2010). The increase in financial statement transparency and the decrease in the overall level of 
information asymmetry that we document are consistent with such a scenario.  
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Table 1 
Antitakeover Laws by State 
Years of enactment of the antitakeover laws are obtained from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Boldfaced states 
are those where the strength of the laws was high. The letters within parentheses denote the various statutes 
implemented in that state. Specifically, a refers to Control Share Acquisition, b refers to Freezeout Provision, c 
refers to Fair Price Provision, d refers to Anti-Greenmail Provision, e refers to Golden Parachute Restrictions, f 
refers to Expanded Constituency Provision, g refers to Poison Pill Endorsement, h refers to Assumption of Labor 
Contracts, i refers to Disgorgement Provision, and j refers to Control Share Cash-Out Statute.  
State 
Year of 
enactment 
of the law 
Number of 
sample firms 
incorporated 
in the state State 
Year of 
enactment 
of the law 
Number of 
sample firms 
incorporated 
in the state 
      
Alabama  3 Montana  1 
Alaska  1 Nebraska (a, b) 1988 5 
Arizona (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) 1987 8 Nevada (a, b, c, f, g) 1991 101 
Arkansas  4 New Hampshire  0 
California  206 New Jersey (b, c, f, g) 1986 76 
Colorado  61 New Mexico  2 
Connecticut (b, c, f, g) 1989 14 New York (b, c, d, f, g) 1985 138 
Delaware (b, h) 1988 2943 North Carolina  36 
District of Columbia  1 North Dakota  0 
Florida  131 Ohio (a, b, c, f, g, i) 1990 83 
Georgia (b, c, g) 1988 67 Oklahoma (a, b) 1991 18 
Hawaii  2 Oregon  47 
Idaho (a, b, c, f, g) 1988 2 
Pennsylvania (a, b, c, f, g, h, 
i, j) 1989 111 
Illinois (b, c, f, g, h) 1989 21 Rhode Island (b, c, f, g, h) 1990 5 
Indiana (a, b, c, f, g) 1986 48 South Carolina (a, b, g) 1988 11 
Iowa  8 South Dakota (a, b, c, f, g, j) 1990 4 
Kansas (a, b) 1989 9 Tennessee (a, b, c, d, g) 1988 37 
Kentucky (b, c, f, g) 1987 7 Texas  89 
Louisiana  11 Utah  30 
Maine (b, f, g, j) 1988 4 Vermont  3 
Maryland (a, b, c, g) 1989 48 Virginia (a, b, c, g) 1988 58 
Massachusetts (a, b, c, g) 1989 117 Washington (b, c, g) 1987 63 
Michigan (a, b, c, g) 1989 48 West Virginia  1 
Minnesota (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) 1987 149 Wisconsin (a, b, c, d, f, g) 1987 50 
Mississippi  2 Wyoming (a, b, f) 1989 2 
Missouri (a, b, c, f, g) 1986 30    
        
  
- 42 - 
 
Table 2  
Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the information environment variables used in this study. RSQ is the 
adjusted-R2 from a firm-specific time-series regression of price on earnings and book value of equity. PIN is the 
estimate of probability of information-based trading based on Easley et al. (2002). NPR is the net purchase 
transactions by management-insiders computed each firm-year as (number of purchase transactions less number of 
sales transactions) scaled by the (number of purchase transactions plus number of sales transactions) based on 
Frankel and Li (2004). LAMBDA is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread following Madhavan et 
al. (1997). SIGMA is the monthly logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility estimated from the Fama-
French four-factor model (Ferreira and Laux 2007). AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years a firm has a 
record in Compustat. SIZE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s book value of assets (Compustat Data6).  
   
  Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
       
PIN 24,052 0.209 0.199 0.074 0.062 0.488 
NPR 23,549 0.313 1.000 0.836 -1.000 1.000 
LAMBDA 28,286 0.003 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.806 
SIGMA 74,307 1.718 1.652 1.118 -31.61 8.089 
RSQ 25,064 0.354 0.306 0.259 0.002 0.970 
AGE 28,286 2.534 2.565 0.815 0.693 3.871 
SIZE 28,286 5.199 5.085 1.885 0.166 9.012 
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Table 3 
Antitakeover Laws and Information Asymmetry 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of BC laws on analyst behavior. The 
dependent variable in Column (1) is PIN, in Column (2) is LAMBDA, in Column (3) is NPR, and in Column (4) is 
SIGMA. PIN, NPR and LAMBDA are defined in Table 2. ANTITAKEOVER is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed an antitakeover law. AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years a firm has a record in Compustat. SIZE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s book value of assets (Compustat 
Data6). I_PIN, I_NPR, I_LAMBDA and I_SIGMA are variables that indicate the mean of PIN, NPR, LAMBDA, and 
SIGMA, respectively, in the firm’s industry, excluding the firm itself. S_PIN, S_NPR, S_LAMBDA, and S_SIGMA 
are variables that indicate the mean of PIN, NPR, LAMBDA, and SIGMA, respectively, in the firm’s state of location, 
excluding the firm itself. Standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. The specifications include 
unreported annual and firm fixed-effects. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PIN LAMBDA NPR SIGMA 
         
ANTITAKEOVER -0.008** -0.001*** -0.284** -0.103*** 
 (-2.218) (-3.895) (-2.469) (-5.212) 
AGE 0.009*** 0.001** 0.079*** -0.046*** 
 (3.039) (2.570) (3.835) (-2.923) 
SIZE -0.024*** -0.001*** -0.044*** -0.100*** 
 (-12.22) (-4.625) (-3.481) (-16.24) 
S_PIN 0.225***    
 (8.446)    
I_PIN 0.100***    
 (7.902)    
S_LAMBDA  0.002**   
  (2.647)   
I_LAMBDA  0.000   
  (0.454)   
S_NPR   0.037  
   (0.739)  
I_NPR   0.101***  
   (3.914)  
S_SIGMA    0.032 
    (1.207) 
I_SIGMA    0.146*** 
    (12.18) 
     
Observations 24,052 28,286 23,549 74,086 
R-squared 0.638 0.228 0.424 0.259 
Adj. R-squared 0.584 0.0609 0.236 0.127 
  
- 44 - 
 
Table 4 
Effect of Lobbying 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the role of lobbying in the relation between 
antitakeover laws and firms’ information environment. ANTITAKEOVER (-1) is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the firm is incorporated in a state that will pass an antitakeover law in one year from now. ANTITAKEOVER (0) is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that passes an antitakeover law this year. 
ANTITAKEOVER (1) and ANTITAKEOVER (2+) are dummy variables that equal one if the firm is incorporated in a 
state that passed a antitakeover law one year and two or more years ago, respectively. All other variables are defined 
in previous tables. Standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. Time-effects and firm-effects are 
included. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PIN LAMBDA NPR SIGMA 
         
ANTITAKEOVER (-1) -0.002 0.001 -0.213 0.008 
 (-0.435) (0.887) (-1.133) (0.375) 
ANTITAKEOVER (0) -0.004** -0.001*** -0.326** -0.109*** 
 (-2.093) (-4.396) (-2.561) (-6.221) 
ANTITAKEOVER (1) -0.006** -0.001 -0.444*** -0.095*** 
 (-2.251) (-1.244) (-3.839) (-3.601) 
ANTITAKEOVER (2+) -0.013*** -0.001** -0.518*** -0.083*** 
 (-3.888) (-2.288) (-3.969) (-3.255) 
AGE 0.012*** 0.001** 0.160*** -0.054*** 
 (3.861) (2.348) (4.532) (-2.715) 
SIZE -0.024*** -0.001*** -0.036*** -0.100*** 
 (-12.30) (-4.532) (-3.041) (-16.39) 
I_PIN 0.096***    
 (7.559)    
S_PIN 0.199***    
 (7.863)    
I_LAMBDA  0.000   
  (0.454)   
S_LAMBDA  0.002**   
  (2.661)   
I_NPR   0.101***  
   (3.815)  
S_NPR   0.041  
   (0.836)  
I_SIGMA    0.146*** 
    (12.22) 
S_SIGMA    0.037 
    (1.356) 
     
Observations 24,052 28,286 23,549 74,086 
R-squared 0.639 0.228 0.425 0.259 
Adj. R-squared 0.584 0.061 0.237 0.127 
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Table 5 
Antitakeover Laws and Financial Statement Informativeness 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of antitakeover laws on accounting 
informativeness. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is RSQ, as defined in Table 2. I_RSQ and S_RSQ 
are the mean values of RSQ in the firm’s industry and state of location, respectively, excluding the firm itself. The 
dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is EQ, is the absolute value of residuals from the accruals model as 
defined in Barth et al. (2001). I_EQ and S_EQ are the mean values of EQ in the firm’s industry and state of location, 
respectively, excluding the firm itself. All other variables are as defined in the previous tables. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. The specifications include unreported annual and firm fixed-effects. t-
statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RSQ RSQ EQ EQ 
      
ANTITAKEOVER 0.017**  -0.008***  
 (2.470)  (-5.370)  
ANTITAKEOVER (-1)  0.000  -0.003 
  (0.0318)  (-1.219) 
ANTITAKEOVER (0)  -0.004  -0.010*** 
  (-0.373)  (-5.206) 
ANTITAKEOVER (1)  0.007  -0.009*** 
  (0.511)  (-5.752) 
ANTITAKEOVER (2+)  0.031**  -0.011*** 
  (2.126)  (-6.897) 
     
I_RSQ 0.059*** 0.057***   
 (2.931) (3.004)   
S_RSQ -0.027 -0.056   
 (-0.363) (-0.856)   
I_EQ   0.051*** 0.051*** 
   (3.220) (3.226) 
S_EQ   -0.042 -0.045 
   (-1.567) (-1.664) 
SIZE -0.011 -0.011 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-1.586) (-1.545) (-12.64) (-12.26) 
AGE -0.123*** -0.144*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-4.981) (-4.291) (0.829) (1.119) 
     
Observations 27,622 27,622 36,814 36,814 
R-squared 0.530 0.530 0.355 0.355 
Adj. R-squared 0.461 0.462 0.217 0.217 
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Table 6 
Antitakeover Laws and Analyst Behavior 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of antitakeover laws on analyst 
behavior. The dependent variable in Column (1) is COVERAGE, in Column (2) is DISPERSION, and Column (3) is 
AF_ERROR. COVERAGE is the number of estimates in the annual earnings forecast. DISPERSION is the standard 
deviation of the annual earnings forecast scaled by the mean estimate. AF_ERROR is the absolute analyst forecast 
error computed as the actual estimate less the mean estimate scaled by logarithm of firm assets. ANTITAKEOVER is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed an antitakeover law. AGE is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years a firm has a record in Compustat. SIZE is the natural logarithm of a 
firm’s book value of assets (Compustat Data6). I_COVERAGE, I_DISPERSION, and I_AF_ERROR are variables 
that indicate the mean of COVERAGE, DISPERSION, and AF_ERROR, respectively, in the firm’s industry, 
excluding the firm itself. S_COVERAGE, S_DISPERSION, and S_AF_ERROR are variables that indicate the mean 
of COVERAGE, DISPERSION, and AF_ERROR, respectively, in the firm’s state of location, excluding the firm 
itself. Standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. The specifications include unreported annual 
fixed-effects.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 COVERAGE DISPERSION AF_ERROR 
        
ANTITAKEOVER -0.428** -0.021* -0.011** 
 (-2.367) (-1.944) (-1.976) 
AGE -0.253* -0.021*** 0.038*** 
 (-1.714) (-3.114) (16.99) 
SIZE 2.115*** 0.014*** -0.023*** 
 (30.28) (4.061) (-17.12) 
S_COVERAGE 0.490***   
 (6.754)   
I_COVERAGE 0.315***   
 (12.35)   
S_DISPERSION  0.027  
  (1.477)  
I_DISPERSION  0.007  
  (0.404)  
S_AF_ERROR   0.000 
   (1.568) 
I_AF_ERROR   -0.000* 
   (-1.807) 
    
Observations 38,905 29,680 38,675 
R-squared 0.885 0.269 0.597 
Adj. R-squared 0.860 0.090 0.510 
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Table 7  
Effect of Antitakeover Laws on Financial Statement Informativeness:  
The Role of the Quiet Life 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of antitakeover laws on accounting 
informativeness for a subsample of firms where managers pursue the quiet life and those where managers do not. 
The dependent variable, EQ, is the absolute value of residuals from the accruals model as defined in Barth et al. 
(2001). I_EQ and S_EQ are the mean values of EQ in the firm’s industry and state of location, respectively, 
excluding the firm itself. All other variables are as defined in the previous tables. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) 
represent the subsample corresponding to the quiet life, and Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) represent the subsample 
corresponding to firms that do not enjoy the quiet life. Standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation 
level. The specifications include unreported annual and firm fixed-effects. t-statistics are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ 
          
ANTITAKEOVER -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.056) (-2.879) (-3.759) (-4.056) (-2.753) (-3.454) (-4.494) (-4.333) 
I_EQ 0.087* -0.055* -0.104* -0.024 -0.084* -0.027 -0.100 -0.036 
 (1.996) (-1.836) (-1.765) (-0.873) (-1.814) (-0.948) (-1.042) (-1.376) 
S_EQ 0.099*** 0.042** 0.079* 0.042*** 0.080*** 0.032 0.069 0.047*** 
 (3.122) (2.609) (1.950) (2.784) (3.763) (1.564) (1.518) (3.196) 
SIZE 0.007*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.000 
 (2.811) (0.910) (0.556) (0.617) (1.080) (0.697) (1.701) (0.0150) 
AGE -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.010) (-12.76) (-3.508) (-10.88) (-6.391) (-10.97) (-3.393) (-12.26) 
         
Sample 
Negative 
Asset 
Growth 
Positive 
Asset 
Growth 
Negative 
PP&E 
Growth 
Positive 
PP&E 
Growth 
Negative 
COGS 
Growth 
Positive 
COGS 
Growth 
Negative 
Adv Exp 
Growth 
Positive 
Adv Exp 
Growth 
         
Observations 6,774 30,040 6,083 30,731 13,390 23,424 4,942 31,872 
R-squared 0.300 0.365 0.320 0.360 0.303 0.376 0.313 0.361 
Adj. R-squared 0.193 0.219 0.217 0.214 0.204 0.213 0.217 0.215 
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Table 8 
Effect of Antitakeover Laws on Financial Statement Informativeness:  
The Role of Career Concerns 
 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of antitakeover laws on accounting 
informativeness for the subsample of firms with low and high (i.e., below and above the median value, respectively) 
probability of takeover, which is estimated as the predicted value from the logistic regression specified in Cremers, 
Nair, and John (2009) and described in Section 4.4. I_EQ and S_EQ are the mean values of EQ in the firm’s 
industry and state of location, respectively, excluding the firm itself. I_RSQ and S_RSQ are the mean values of RSQ 
in the firm’s industry and state of location, respectively, excluding the firm itself. All other variables are as defined 
in the previous tables. Standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. The specifications include 
unreported annual and firm fixed-effects. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 EQ EQ 
    
ANTITAKEOVER -0.014** -0.004** 
 (-2.227) (-2.398) 
I_EQ 0.028 0.049** 
 (0.839) (2.140) 
S_EQ 0.018 -0.003 
 (0.311) (-0.073) 
SIZE -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.846) (-7.449) 
AGE 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (-2.561) (5.564) 
   
Sample 
Below Median 
Probability of 
Takeover 
Above Median 
Probability of 
Takeover 
   
Observations 11,586 23,689 
R-squared 0.518 0.391 
Adj. R-squared 0.252 0.220 
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Table 9 
Effect of Antitakeover Laws on Financial Statement Informativeness: 
 The Role of Equity Issuance 
 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of antitakeover laws on accounting 
informativeness for the subsample of firms with and without equity issuance. The dependent variable, EQ, is the 
absolute value of residuals from the accruals model as defined in Barth et al. (2001). I_EQ and S_EQ are the mean 
values of EQ in the firm’s industry and state of location, respectively, excluding the firm itself. All other variables 
are as defined in the previous tables. Equity issuance is defined based on Chen et al. (2010) as the ratio of split-
adjusted shares outstanding between two years. Standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. The 
specifications include unreported annual and firm fixed-effects. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients 
within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 EQ EQ 
    
ANTITAKEOVER -0.006** -0.005 
 (-2.495) (-0.788) 
I_EQ -0.066 0.064 
 (-1.142) (0.798) 
S_EQ 0.084*** -0.046 
 (3.614) (-1.098) 
SIZE 0.000 0.003 
 (0.016) (1.151) 
AGE -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (-10.370) (-2.726) 
   
Sample Net Equity Issuers Non-Net Equity Issuers 
   
Observations 25,895 8,886 
R-squared 0.405 0.523 
Adj. R-squared 0.220 0.280 
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Table 10 
Antitakeover Laws and Financial Reporting: An Alternative Approach 
This table presents the results of the regression model that examines the effect of antitakeover laws on the 
informativeness of accruals and cash flow based on the approach of Easton and Harris (1991). The dependent 
variable is cumulative return starting three months after fiscal year end t-1 to six months after fiscal year end t. 
EARN is the firm’s earnings in year t scaled by its assets at the end of year t-1. CFO is the firm’s cash flow from 
operations in year t scaled by its assets at the end of year t-1. TOT_ACCRUALS is a firm’s earnings in year t minus 
the cash flow from operations in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. Columns (3) and (4) 
examine the informativeness of discretionary accruals (DA) and nondiscretionary accruals (ND_ACCRUALS). 
Column (3) uses the Jones model approach to calculate the discretionary accruals, while model (4) is performance-
matched discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005). ANTITAKEOVER is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed an antitakeover law. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state-of-incorporation level. Annual and firm fixed-effects are included but not reported. t-statistics are presented 
beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
(1) 
RET 
(2) 
RET 
(3) 
RET 
(4) 
RET 
     
EARN 0.868***    
 (8.324)    
EARN * ANTITAKEOVER 0.506***    
 (5.442)    
CFO  0.741*** 0.735*** 0.736*** 
  (4.602) (4.442) (4.621) 
CFO * ANTITAKEOVER  0.255 0.274 0.247 
  (1.267) (1.344) (1.235) 
TOT_ACCRUALS  0.472***   
  (3.971)   
TOT_ACCRUALS*ANTITAKEOVER  0.505***   
  (3.622)   
ND_ACCRUALS   0.568*** 0.738*** 
   (5.198) (2.963) 
ND_ACCRUALS* ANTITAKEOVER   0.219 0.634** 
   (1.320) (2.475) 
DA    0.447*** 0.437*** 
   (3.195) (3.916) 
DA * ANTITAKEOVER   0.572*** 0.482*** 
   (3.686) (3.506) 
ANTITAKEOVER 0.009 0.030 0.016 0.035 
 (0.398) (1.550) (0.716) (1.555) 
     
Observations 41,186 41,186 41,186 41,186 
R-squared 0.250 0.244 0.244 0.244 
Adj. R-squared 0.104 0.096 0.096 0.096 
 
